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Gareth Evans, in The Causal Theory of Names, states that the causal theory of reference needs to 
be expanded to include what he calls multiple "bases". After the initial baptism, the use of the name 
in the presence of the person can, under the right circumstances, be considered as reinforcing the 
name in its referent. For those who are in direct contact with the person, the reference for the 
expression of the name is solved by means of a causal chain that includes people who knew him during 
the "baptism", or by indexing the person to the name at the time of communication. The causal chain 
can continue through a series of referential uses of the name throughout the person's life. If confusion 
occurs, the referent switching of a name may occur. (Evans and Altham 1973) 
According to Evans, causal theory in its initial variant allows that no matter how distant or 
obscure the causal link between the use of a proper name and the object originally referred to, the 
reference is retained. The theory thus ignores the context by resorting to "magic tricks", and therefore 
cannot explain the changes of reference. 
Evans agrees with Kripke in rejecting the descriptive theory of reference, arguing that a subject 
may think of a particular object by virtue of the existence of a contextual relationship with it; but it 
challenges the cryptic image by accepting the idea that a name may change its reference over time and 
arguing that a mere causal link is not enough to refer. 
Subsequently, in The Varieties of Reference, assumes Frege's principle "no reference, no thought" 
(a sentence containing a name without a reference has no value of truth and does not express a 
thought); thus the semantic function of a name is to refer to an object, excluding the name with sense 
but non-referential. (Evans 1982) But, unlike Frege, he appeals to Frege's assimilation of the use of 
empty names with the fictional uses of language that express the pretended senses or pretended 
thoughts. (Borchert 2006) 
For Evans, the singular terms (including those that include demonstrative pronouns) conform 
to the principle "no reference, no thought", calling them "Russellians". 
Evans rejects the solid thesis (that the theoretical conditions of the description are sufficient) 
by accepting the weaker thesis that a descriptive identification is required for the name. He thus sees 
the theory of undifferentiated description as an expression of two ideas. 
"(a) the denotation of a name is determined by what speakers intend to refer to by using the name 
"(b) the object a speaker intends to refer to by his use of a name is that which satisfies or fits the 
majority of descriptions which make up the cluster of information which the speaker has 
associated with the name." (Evans and Altham 1973) 
With (a) there are problems when interpreted at the micro level, but in names, as for other 
expressions in the language, "what they signify depends upon what we use them to signify". (b) is the 
real problem: the intended referent of a common use of a name by a speaker cannot be an element 
causal isolated to the user's community and culture; but " the important causal relation lies between 
that item’s states and doings and the speaker’s body of information—not between the item’s being 
dubbed with a name and the speaker’s contemporary use of it." (Evans and Altham 1973) Denoting a 
name in the community will depend in a complex way of what those who use this term intend to refer 
to (the "intended referent"). 
Evans tries to eliminate the problem of ambiguity by using an indefinite notion of speaker 
reference through borrowing from communication theory. We gain our knowledge and form our 
beliefs in the process of collecting information through a causal interaction with a particular object 
that is part of a long causal chain. Legends and imagination can add new elements. Incorrect 
identification can differentiate the considered source of information from the real one. It turns out 
that a set of information may contain elements from different sources, being able to reach a dominant 
element belonging to a source different from the original one. A speaker usually refers to the dominant 
element in the associated set of information. 
In this context, Evans offers the following definition proposal: 
"“NN” is a name of x if there is a community C— 
"1. in which it is common knowledge that members of C have in their repertoire the procedure of 
using “NN” to refer to x (with the intention of referring to x); 
2. the success in reference in any particular case being intended to rely on common knowledge between 
speaker and hearer that “NN” has been used to refer to x by members of C and not upon 
common knowledge of the satisfaction by x of some predicate embedded in “NN”" 
Thus, Evans distinguishes between using on the basis of what we know and using on other 
bases, thus distinguishing between the referential functioning of names, which can be grammatical 
descriptions, from those of descriptions. (Evans and Altham 1973) The intentions alone are not 
sufficient for a name to obtain a denotation, but without clear intentions there may be no common 
knowledge required for practice. 
Evans's conditions are stricter than Kripke's, eliminating his "magic." 
In order to allow the name to be able to change its denotation, Evans proposes a supplement 
to the above definition with a new, deferential term (regarding individuals or groups of people who 
extend the use of expressions in a community). 
Evans offers various arguments to show that Kripke's theory does not fit our practice of using 
names: contextual determination of who it is important except for causal theory, (Bhowmick 2015, 
194) one can use the name without be necessarily causal connected with other users of the name, there 
is the possibility of a unified approach for all the ways of eliminating the ambiguity of the discourse, 
the change of reference is not taken into account by the causal theory of the reference. 
In conclusion Evans does not claim that causal theory is wrong; he is just trying to adapt it to 
the use of people's names under ordinary circumstances. 
Gareth Evans states that there may be wide variations between understanding "producers" 
(people associating names with person recognition) and "consumers" (who, according to Evans, are 
not able to inject new information into practice, but must use the collection of information from 
producers. (Evans 1982)) of proper name statements. According to Sikander Iamil, "acceptors" are 
true players in using proper names, using the name of a specific referent based on information received 
from other speakers. But there is a possibility of distortion of the received information, since the 
proper names strengthened, after their appointment, only by their use by the acceptors: "The meaning 
of proper name is provided by its immediate correspondence with a particular object. That’s why a 
proper name and referent should go together; thinking one will lead the other. We may also assert that 
any speaker may use a certain name even without having an understanding of it, which means simply 
the understanding of the corresponding object i.e. its referent. But one may claim that any 
misinformation may contaminate thinking of ' the speaker regarding the referent of name.” (Jamil 
2011) Evans argues that "Full understanding of a use of a name requires that the referent of the name 
be an object of the subject’s thought." (Evans 1982) Thus, the proper name depends on the users' 
faith, thoughts and intentions. 
Only one producer presents sound arguments because of his initial knowledge of the name. 
The consumer knows the referent only according to the information provided by the producer. 
The more often a name is used by speakers, the more it strengthens in the minds of the 
speakers, making it more and more authentic. If a name with different referents in two distinct 
communication networks, additional information is required for correct identification when the 
information passes from one network to the other. 
A special problem arises in the case of a community that functions as a closed but permeable 
information system. In such a closed system a name can be distorted (intentionally or not), resulting 
in several proper names for the same referent that can operate in parallel, sometimes overlapping in 
the communication between different networks. This distortion can take the form of spreading fake 
news, or it can be intentionally used in the processes of slandering a person or a group of people, or 
even within state propaganda. In such a case, the framework for stipulating the reference by name 
proposed by Kripke through the initial baptism no longer applies. This distortion will not occur when 
the recursive principle proposed by Saul Kripke is applied, (Kripke 1980) whereby the one who 
established the reference to the initial baptism stipulates practices in the use of their own names, and 
the consumers will use the name in this respect, calling for a specific use identical to the one proposed 
by the one who named it. 
Reference change is not possible according to descriptive theories. Initial causal theories do 
not pose the problem of reference change. Gareth Evans considers the significance of the change of 
reference, possible even from the initial baptism, although changing the reference to one's own name 
is much more difficult than in the case of natural terms, setting the Madagascar case as an example. 
(Evans and Altham 1973) 
Evans argued that the bearer of a proper name, used by a community of speakers, is the main 
source of causality of the information that members of the community associate with the name. 
Imogen Dickie sees Evans' suggestion as a major breakthrough, but it raises some issues. (Dickie 2011) 
Dickie takes "proper name" as a standard or default semantic type natural term, for which no 
additional settings are required. This assertion allows proper names to be used in other ways (e.g., to 
communicate about objects other than their bearers) depending on the scenarios. 
Dickie concludes that Evans is right that proper name has an essentially asymmetrical 
structure, assigning a privileged role to a core group of speakers. But Evans is wrong in stating that 
producers are important in establishing a name-based practice, suggesting that the role of producers 
is to ensure dominance, but that does not imply the exact transmission of information. The consumers 
are the active participants. 
According to Evans, the mental state of the speaker matters in determining the reference. For 
him, the causal origin of a name is not important in the reference; an object derives a name by virtue 
of the fact that it is the main source of causality of the information associated with a name. (Bhowmick 
2015, 195) But, by eliminating the need for initial baptism, Evans's theory raises two objections: the 
qua problem and the problem of incorrect causal source. 
The qua problem is considering the example of the cat "Trump" who was actually a flowerpot. 
From an intuitive point of view, it seems that the use of this name does not refer to anything, it is an 
empty name. It follows that successful referencing requires that the individual initiating the use of a 
name has at least a correct notion of the object it refers to. 
The problem of the incorrect causal source arises when the referent is no longer related to a 
name by individuals who were in the presence of the object. 
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